Dalhousie Law Journal
Volume 15
Issue 1 15:1 (1992) Special Issue: "Democratic
Intellect" Symposium

Article 8

7-1-1992

Economic Actors in the Work of Madame Justice Wilson
Maureen Maloney
University of Victoria

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj
Part of the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Maureen Maloney, "Economic Actors in the Work of Madame Justice Wilson" (1992) 15:1 Dal LJ 197.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

Maureen Maloney

Economic Actors in the Work
of Madame Justice Wilson*

When I was asked to present a paper at this conference, I agreed with
some trepidation. I have noticed that tax and corporate papers are
rarely a hit at legal conferences which offer a smorgasbord of legal
topics....I first noticed this when at a large conference I was once
attending, half the audience fell asleep as the topic of my paper was
announced and the other half made a dash for the exit.
Accordingly I tried to come up with something interesting around
which to develop my discussion of Madame Justice Bertha Wilson's
economic decisions. And reading again through Justice Wilson's
wonderful speech, "Will Women Judges Make a Difference?", I found
my answer in one of her more provocative statements, which seemed
to have passed unnoticed in the press. Given that the rest of the text
was, in some form or other, quoted verbatim, this surprised me.
Justice Wilson's quote read as follows:
Taking from my own experience as a judge of fourteen years' standing,
working closely with my male colleagues on the bench, there are
probably whole areas of the law on which there is no uniquely feminine
perspective....the principles and the underlying premises are so firmly
entrenched and so fundamentally sound that no good would be achieved
by attempting to re-invent the wheel, even if the revised version did
have a few more spokes in it. I have in mind areas such as the law of
contract, the law of real property and the law applicable to corporations.'
This seemed to me to be a challenge that I could not refuse, having
taught tax and corporate courses from a feminist perspective for
several years. Accordingly I was delighted to be asked to be a speaker
at this conference, primarily of course, because like many others in the
legal profession, I have been an admirer of Justice Wilson's work for
many years. Accordingly it is a pleasure to have been invited to
participate with all sectors of the legal community in honouring her.
However I must also admit that as an academic I relish the opportunity
to show Justice Wilson that she has occasionally applied a feminist
* Professor Maureen Maloney, Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Victoria.
1. Bertha Wilson, "Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?" [The Fourth Annual
Barbara Betcherman Memorial Lecture, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Feb. 8,

19901 (1990), 28 Osgoode Hall L. 507 at 515.
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view of the corporate world and perhaps, for the times that she has not,
to foster in her a wistful regret..for the lost opportunity.
One cannot discuss corporate or tax law, or indeed any law for that
matter, in a value vacuum. How we interpret, analyse and assess
factual situations and the legal analysis of them will differ depending
upon our individual, and occasionally, collective or societal perspectives. In the economic sphere, a great deal depends upon one's world
view of the primary economic actors in our society - corporations; and
the main economic laws - the tax laws. At the outset I should state that
a major reason for my disagreement with some of Justice Wilson's
decisions is due to the fact that, on some occasions, Madame Justice
Wilson and I hold different views of the role of corporate entities in
our society and even conceptual differences as to what a corporation is
legally. At the risk of being overly simplistic, I believe that the
differences for the most part can be traced to the conflict between the
feminist view of the role of corporations as part of a system of social
and economic cooperation and the conflicting view of the corporation
as the objective icon fueling a patriarchal driven free market economy
as espoused by one of the leaders of the scottish enlightenment Adam Smith. Such different world views also results in differing
methodologies for solving problems, legal and otherwise.
Lest that seem too rhetorical, let me place this more in perspective
and with less jargon. Accordingly I will have to use a non-lawyers
example....
Carol Gilligan, a psychologist, in her renowned book In A Different Voice2 , introduces us to Jake and Amy and demonstrates how their
world views differ. (I would note parenthetically that Gilligan remains silent on the nature-nurture debate). Gilligan illustrates this by
an experiment carried out on small children of differing genders
immortalised in the form of Jake and Amy. The contrast of their
differing world views is most starkly pronounced and located in
differing intellectual methodologies of dealing with difficult issues:
the ethic of caring in the case of Amy and the ethic of rights and rules
in the case of Jake. Both children were asked whether it was
legitimate for a man, Heinz, to rob a pharmacy in order to obtain
vitally needed drugs for his dying wife that the family could not
afford. Jake sympathised with the dilemna and thought that Heinz
should rob the pharmacy although it might be illegal. A rights analysis
dictated that the need to protect the dying women was greater than the

2. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
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need to uphold the law. Amy however thought more about the
consequences to all the individuals involved rather than applying a
strict rules and rights interest analysis. Accordingly, she was both
more caring and pragmatic: could Heinz not explain his predicament
more clearly to the pharmacist, perhaps he could pay for the drugs
over a longer period of time, perhaps he could borrow the money from
elsewhere. Amy was concerned about the effect of the theft on Heinz,
on the pharmacist and on Heinz's wife (she might be left alone if
Heinz was jailed). I believe this same ethic of caring triumphing over
rights-oriented logic can (and should) be applied in corporate cases as
much as Madame Justice Wilson has done in other important cases,
such as the Guerin 3 and Lavallee 4 cases, although the interest base
may not be as clear and may require deeper investigation. Blind faith
in linear logic is no substitute for taking a more expansive view which
would result in greater fairness. Madame Justice Wilson has shown
this can be done very clearly in some cases even in the corporate
arena. A good illustration of this, is Justice Wilson's dissent in the
case of HunterEngineeringCo. v. Syncrude.5
Hunter v. Syncrude Inc. is the case, as contract lawyers will recollect, where Syncrude CanadaLtd., sued Hunter Engineering Co., Inc.
and Allis-Chalmers Canada Ltd., for defective gear boxes. Both
defendants raised the fact that there was an express warranty, with a
time-limit which had now passed.
The final question before the court was whether a fundamental
breach could be covered under an exclusion clause in the contract or,
did the whole contract, exclusion clause and all, like the king's men,
come tumbling down. The majority of the court held that an exclusion
clause remained effective even in the event of a fundamental breach.
An exclusion clause would only be set aside if the doctrine of
unconscionability could be invoked. Justice Wilson wrote a separate
judgement (with which Justice L'Heureux-Dube concurred), expanding the circumstances under which an exclusion clause would be set
aside. Justice Wilson recognised that unconscionability depends and
is focussed on whether, looking at all the circumstances, there is an
imbalance of bargaining power at the time the contract is made. Such
an approach might achieve certainty in commercial transactions but
only at the risk of injustice. The commercial world is a complex one
in which simple rules may wreak inequity. Justice Wilson proposed a
3. Guerin v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 6 W.W.R. 481, 13 D.LR. (4th) 321.
4. R. v. Lavallee, [19901 1 S.C.R. 852.
5. HunterEngineeringCo. v. Syncrude CanadaLtd., [1989] 1S.C.R. 426; 57 D.LR. (4th) 321.
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better solution which would force the courts to recognise that "the
results of enforcing such exclusions clauses could be harsh if the
parties had not adequately anticipated or considered the possibility of
the contract's disintegration through fundamental breach." 6 Justice
Wilson recognised the need to explore the consequences of the breach
for the parties and not simply their actions. Accordingly for her, the
test had to be one which encompassed the fate of the parties:
It is preferable...to determine whether or not the impugned clause
should be enforced in all the circumstances of the case and avoid
reliance on awkward and artificial labels
The end result is that Justice Wilson refuses to be bound by narrow
legalism. Instead she proposes a more caring, purposive approach to
exclusion clauses requiring their enforcement to be dependent on the
circumstances and effects of the breach in addition to unequal bargaining power at the time the contract is entered. Amy would be
proud.
However this was a case involving two corporate entities. For
Justice Wilson different factors come into play when one of the actors
is the government. In cases involving the government, it is obvious
that for Justice Wilson there is a real tension between communitarian
interests and the liberties of specific individuals. For the most part,
Justice Wilson demonstrates a clear preference for individual liberties
over state or communitarian interests; reflective perhaps of her Scottish enlightenment roots firmly embedded in the spirit of individualism. Sometimes these liberal notions have helped disadvantaged
groups as one of Justice Wilson's more celebrated judgements The
Queen v. Morgentalereillustrates. Nonetheless there is still considerable cause for concern with some of the sweeping individualistic
statements made in that case by Justice Wilson. For example, at one
point in the judgement she comments:
"The Charter is predicated on a particular conception of the place of the
individual in society. An individual is not a totally independent entity
disconnected from the society in which he or she lives. Neither,
however, is the individual a mere cog in an impersonal machine in
which his or her values, goals and aspirations are subordinated to those
of the collectivity. The individual is a bit of both. The Charter reflects
this reality by leaving a wide range of activities and decisions open to

6. Ibid., at 508 (S.C.R.); 375 (D.L.R.).
7. ibd, at 518 (S.C.R.); 382 (D.LR.).
8. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 44 D.LR (4th) 385.

Economic Actors in the Work of Mme Justice Wilson

legitimate government control while at the same time placing limits on
the proper scope of that control. Thus, the rights guaranteed in the
Charter erect around each individual, metaphorically speaking, an invisible fence over which the state will not be allowed to trespass. The
role of the courts is to map out, piece by piece, the parameters of the
fence.9
While this is undoubtedly a laudable objective, it is not without its
downsides. Exclusion from others may not be the best for us as
individuals or for society. And the court has had obvious difficulty in
drawing the appropriate lines. Justice Wilson herself has drawn the
line in different places. In my opinion, especially in the case of
corporations, the line has been drawn in a manner that is too restrictive
of the role which government must of necessity play in our sophisticated society. And this has resulted in part from Justice Wilson's
belief enunciated later in the Morgentalercase that:
[The] basic theory underlying the Charter, [is] that the state will respect
choices made by individuals and, to the greatest extent possible, will
avoid subordinating these choices to any one conception of the good
life.10 .
Such individualistic notions of autonomy whilst attractive can
result in dangerous outcomes for democratic societies. These dangers
are probably most apparent when notions of autonomy and individuality are applied to corporations. In this arena more than most, the
individual - communitarian conflict is most obvious. With changing
notions of democracy this will become an increasing site of struggle.
Democracy can only be effectively maintained by limiting the power
and influence of corporations." Such control over the corporate
sphere can only be exercised by the legislatures and courts though
legislation and other legal regulation. In most economic cases, Justice
Wilson has shown a remarkable reluctance to allow this type of
control or regulation to be exercised by the legislature or to impose
any such regulation by the courts. In most cases, Justice Wilson has
followed Adam Smith's view of the corporate world and how it
should, or more accurately should not, be regulated by governments.
Adam Smith, one of the forefathers of the modem male economy,
sees corporate entities as a good in themselves which should be free
9. Ibid., at 485.
10. Ibid., at 486.
11. See. e.g., E. Drew, Politicsand Money: The New Road To Corruption(New York: MaxMillan,
1983) and R. Miliband, The State In CapitalistSociety (London: Wiedenfield and Nicolson,
1969).
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from state interference to create wealth. Amy however would hypothesise instead that corporations are nothing more or less than economic
machines created by legislation to produce a form of organization that
will benefit society both in its business dealings and by any gains and
productive benefits arising from them. Accordingly, as state creatures, they should be given few powers beyond those bestowed by the
state and should always be subjected in the strictest fashion to safeguards or other restrictions placed on them by the state. Corporations
exist, in the eyes of feminists, for the good of society, the state does
not exist to enhance the powers and potential of corporations. One's
vision of which of these categories the corporation falls within will
profoundly affect how we both make and interpret laws which affect
these economic actors. Justice Wilson has vacillated between both
visions which leaves her at times in an uneasy position. However as I
mentioned before, Justice Wilson has usually veered towards the
Smithian version which often translates into a vision of unrestricted
corporate activity achieved through a laissez-faire legal approach as
exemplified in the examples given later of Thomson Newspapers Ltd.
v. Canada,2 and StubartInvestments Ltd v. The Queen13.
However to characterise Justice Wilson as the champion of the law
and economics movement on the Supreme Court is overly simplistic
and unduly pessimistic. Far from seeing the law solely as a means to
enhance economic efficiency in our society, Justice Wilson has also
been concerned that the morality of law should guide economic behaviour. Again this is reminiscent of Adam Smith who, although
himself the progenitor or foreparent of the law and economics movement, had as the grounding for his ideas "a moral ideal which provides
grounds independent of economic considerations for the regulation of
social interactions."'1 4 Accordingly Justice Wilson's economic decisions portray those of a lawyer, like Adam Smith himself, " whose
economic theory is bounded by moral constraints other than those for
economic efficiency."' 5 For example, I believe that the dissent in
Molchan v. Omega Oil and Gas Ltd.16 springs from these moral roots
though couched in different terms.

12. [1990] 1 S.C.R.425; 67 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (Wilson dissenting).
13. Stubart Investments Lid. v. The Queen [1984] 1 S.C.R. 536.
14. Tom Campbell, "Adam Smith and the Economic Analysis of Law" in Philosophersof the
Scottish Enlightenment ed. B. Hope (Edinburgh: Edin. Univ. Press, 1984) 133 at 134.
15. Ibid., at 134.
16. Molchan v. Omega Oil and Gas Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 348.
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Justice Wilson's View of the Corporation
Nonetheless, the tension between the community and the individual
and the state and the individual is apparent in many judgements. I will
explore three different areas to demonstrate this thesis: cases involving government intervention by statute into corporate affairs; tax
avoidance by corporations; and the internal workings of the corporation.
Government Intervention in CorporateAffairs
There is an interesting contrast in the cases of Thomson Newspapers
Ltd. v. Canada17 (where Justice Wilson wrote a dissenting judgement)
and McKinlay Transportwhere she wrote the majority decision. These
decisions have conflicting views of the role of the state in corporate
affairs.
In Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canadathe issue before the court
was whether two individuals could be served with orders under section 17 of the Combines Investigation Act 8 to appear before the
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission to be examined under oath
and to produce specified documents. Section 20 of the same Act
prohibited the use of information so obtained in future criminal proceedings that might be brought against the individual. The issue was
whether section 17 offended either section 7 (the right to life, liberty
and security of person) or section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure)
of the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms. 9
The section has been widely used over the years by the Bureau of
Competition Policy primarily as a means to obtain documentary evidence by means of a subpoena. In addition it has also been used to
obtain oral testimony from individuals. These sections have been
considered as important means of enforcing Canadian anti-monopoly
laws. The majority of the court speaking through Mr. Justice
La Forest thought section 17 did not infringe upon either section 7 or
8. In part, this was due to the fact that "there can only be a relatively
low expectation of privacy in respect of premises or documents that
are used or produced in the course of activities which, though lawful,
are subject to state regulation as a matter of course."' Moreover "In
17. Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada,Supra n. 12.
18. R.S.C. 1970. c. C-23.
19. The Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C. 1985, en. by the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), c. 11, as am.
by the Constitution Amendment Proclamation,1983, SI/84-102, Sch., in force June 21, 1984,
Sch. B, The CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms.
20. Thompson, Supra n. 12 at 220 (D.LR.).
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so far as section 17 is concemed...it will be typically, if not exclusively, used to order the production of business records.., it is fair to
say that they raise much weaker privacy concerns than personal pa' 21
pers.
However Justice Wilson took a very different view. Why did
Justice Wilson feel so strongly that she wrote a sole dissent? In her
mind, the evil of section 17 was that it constituted, in the words of the
appellants: "a state-imposed trauma [for individuals] which adversely
affects their liberty and security of the person."2
There is no doubt that the section could be construed as infringing
on individual liberties (although primarily corporate interests given
the existence of section 20). The larger and more pressing question,
which is largely left unanswered in Justice Wilson's dissent, is to what
extent and in what circumstances does the government have a right to
invade corporate privacy in order to protect the public interest against
the undesirable monopolistic tendancies of large corporatations?
Even Adam Smith recognised the validity of laws protecting against
the consequences of monopolistic behaviour which he considered
disadvantageous to both the state and corporations:
All monopolies in particular are extremely detrimental....Now all monopolies evidently tend to promote the poverty or, which comes to
the same thing, the uncomeatibleness of the thing so monopolized."
Justice Wilson was unwilling to face this issue simply remarking
that (at 186):
There is, however, in my view a vast difference between a general
regulatory scheme (such as the rules of the road for motorists) designed
to give some order to human behaviour and a state-imposed compulsion on an individual to appear at proceedings against his will and
testify on pain of punishment if he refuses. 4
However the issue need not have been framed in this way. It could
have been reframed to inquire as to whether and in what manner the
activities of corporations should be regulated and what measures
would be needed to enforce the desired amount of regulation. In any
society the rights of the individual must always be balanced against

21. Ibid., at 227-228 (D.LR.).
22. Ibid., at 185 (D.LR.).
23. Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence,Report of 1762-3 (ed. R. L Meek, D. D. Raphael
and P. G. Stein) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978) at p. 83.
24. Thomson, Supra n. 12 at 186.
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the collective right of the people. Indeed this was the very reason for
the enactment of section one. Having decided that section 17 did
infringe on section 7 and 8, the question was therefore whether they
could be saved under section one as necessary in a free and democratic
society.
And this question could have been answered quite easily in the
affirmative. Justice Wilson herself comments that the provisions were
introduced for the public good to stop the emergence of monolithic
corporate entities. Even so, she did not believe that these important
enforcement provisions could be saved under section one as justifiable
in a free and democratic society.
In balancing the interests of the State against those of the corporation, Justice Wilson comes out clearly on the side of the corporation.
Her dissent is "prompted by a concern that the privacy and personal
autonomy and dignity of the individual be respected by the state.".
Justice Wilson clearly expounds on her views of what constitutes a
moral state - one which adopts a Kantian view of the sanctity of the
individual and the concommitant inviobility of privacy rights. This
view has many attractions but it is not without its dark side. Justice
Wilson appears to be in favour of the most limited access by police
and investigative bodies to corporate records and information, achieved
by very expansive notions of privacy. Whilst these are laudable
objectives they are misplaced in the corporate arena.
In this context, it is particularly troubling that Justice Wilson found
that as the section infringed the Charter that it was of no effect
whatsoever even in the case of corporations. The mere fact that a
section offends against persons and therefore becomes invalid against
them does not mean that it has to be, and is therefore, ineffective
against corporations (which were specifically not constitutionally protected) the main players at which the Act and sections were aimed.
Justice Wilson could have ruled the section inoperable against people
(who are constitutionally protected by the Charter) but still valid for
jurisdic individuals. Aware that she might be criticised for having
made it impossible for the State to enforce anti-combines legislation,
Justice Wilson defends her decision on the ground that her strict rule
against state intervention of this type only applies in the case of
proceedings of a criminal or quasi-criminal nature. However such a
defence should not be allowed to obfuscate the fact that she has
effectively given charter privileges to corporations and in a case in
which this can only result in detriment to the public interest.
25. Thomson, Supra n. 12 at 200.
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Not everyone shares my despondence over this stance. Justice
Wilson's views are very attractive and shared by many liberals in the
belief, as Richard Bauman has neatly categorised these viewpoints,
that:
The legal regulation of corporate conduct is best achieved through
treating the enterprise as a jurisdic person....The corporation, therefore,
should be accorded the usual rights and protections that are enjoyed by
any other citizen, including...freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure.26

But, as Bauman points out, such views are distinctly value-laden
and ignore the dangers which powerful economic interests pose to our
democratic institutions and to governments attempting to act in the
public interest. 27 In short, these are fundamental questions which must
be answered in any democratic society. And the answers must be
based on a full social, political and economic evaluation of the actors
and interests at stake. The problem of bringing in constitutional
privileges for corporations is summed up very succinctly by Richard
Bauman:
Kantian notions of human dignity and inviability of the person cannot
simply be attached to the corporate form, whose only raison d'etre for
existence is that it is a convenient vehicle for the pursuit of short-term
economic goals. These aims are premised on considerations of utilitarian rationality and self-interest that cannot simply be assimilated to the
whole range of interests harboured by a natural person. In addition, the
types of harms that may be caused to a human person through objectionable measures taken by governments - for example, the distress
caused by loss of one's bodily or psychological security, or the loss of
one's native language or culture - are hardly analogous to the harms
that may conceivably result to business corporations, which themselves
pursue a very limited range of satisfactions that motivate humans.
With this background firmly in mind, I believe that a better approach would have been to assess the evidence of the advantages and
disadvantages of monopolies from an economic, social and political
pespective. This evidence could then be utilised to assess whether the

26. Richard Bauman, "Liberalism and Canadian Corporate Law" in CanadianPerspectiveson
Legal Theory, ed. Richard F. Devlin (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery, 1991) 75 at 78.
27. See E. Drew, Politicsand Money: The New Road To Corruption (New York: MacMillan,
1983); R. Miliband, The State In CapitalistSociety (London: Wiedenfield and Nicolson, 1969)
and Allan C. Hutchinson and Andrew Petter, "Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of
the Charter" (1988), 38 U.T.LJ. 278.
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legislation under review was the appropriate and best method for the
state to achieve its objectives vis a vis monopolistic corporations.
Indeed even Adam Smith would have been perplexed at this encouragement of monopolies.
Part of the difficulty with Justice Wilson's reasoning is that in the
corporate sphere she relies almost exclusively on legal knowledge and
doctrine to solve social and economic problems and challenges believing that the law is somehow objective or neutral with respect to
corporations. This approach is typically classicist wherein as Kathleen
Lahey says (of someone else but with equal application here):
This analysis is typically classicist not only because it relies only on
"legal" knowledge to resolve social and economic problems, but also
because bits of that "knowledge" are taken out of their original context
and used in an ahistorical, noncontextual manner to produce new
"knowledge".78
What is needed is a new methodology which a feminist analysis
would help. A new formulation of fair outcomes and analysis rests on
and is achieved by an ethic of responsibility and is not one founded on
an ethic of rules, rights and entitlements. 29
There is, at the very least, a need to contextualise the decisions
more using interdisciplinary work from legal historians, sociologists,
and economists among others. I feel that this deficiency has in part
resulted in Justice Wilson's assertion or belief that there is no feminist
perspective on corporate and tax law.
It is interesting to contrast the Thomson decision with the very
different view taken in R. v. McKinlay TransportLtd1° where Justice
Wilson wrote the majority decision. In this case Justice Wilson found
that the demand to produce documents by Revenue Canada was legitimate because the provisions were necessary to enforce the Income
Tax Act. She distinguishes this decision from Thomson on the grounds
that in McKinlay the demands were not intrusive nor were they required in connection with criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings.
Moreover Justice Wilson recognises that:
Since individuals have different expectations of privacy in different
contexts and with regard to different kinds of information and docu-

28. Kathleen A. Lahey and Sarah W. Salter, "Corporate Law in Legal Theory and Legal
Scholarship: From Classicism To Feminism" (1985), 23 Osgoode Hall Li. 543 at 559.
29. Ibid., at 556.
30. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627, 68 D.L.R. (4th) 568.
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ments, it follows that the standard of review of what is "reasonable" in
a given context must be flexible if it is to be realistic and meaningful.3'
And so in the McKinlay case, Justice Wilson takes a more expansive view of the need of the government to require the production of
information - a view, to my mind, more consistent with the realities of
modem fiscal arrangements. Certainly it is a view which places more
emphasis on the public interest as defined by leglislation.
Even so, this is one of the few victories that Revenue Canada has
had at the pen of Justice Wilson. Justice Wilson has not always taken
such an expansive and sympathetic view of provisions in the Income
Tax Act nor of the taxing authorities. This has been particularly so in
tax avoidance decisions.
Tax Avoidance
Justice Wilson has always rightly insisted on fair dealing by the
taxing authorities. So much so that in CanadianPacific Airlines32 ,
Justice Wilson wrote a minority decision requiring the government to
return unconstitutional taxes which had been collected from the airlines despite the fact that the airlines had already passed them onto the
passengers and thus would be unjustly enriched.
Justice Wilson has not demanded the same high standards from
corporate tax avoiders. Indeed, Justice Wilson has been remarkably
lenient with corporate tax avoiders. In the Supreme Court of Canada's
most famous tax avoidance decision in 1984, StubartInvestments Ltd.
v. The Queen33, Justice Wilson agreed with what was, to my mind, a
very disappointing decision. I am of the view that tax avoidance must
be controlled by both the courts and legislatures for the reasons
identified by the Royal Commission on Taxation (the Carter Commission) which include:
1. the loss of revenue to the govemment;
2. the fruitless expenditure of intellectual efforts wasted in the
economically unproductive tax avoidance battle;
3. the deterioration of tax morality since widespread tax avoidance
may foster tax evasion by taxpayers who cannot benefit from tax
avoidance; and
4. the unfair shifting of the tax avoider's tax burden to other
taxpayers. 4
31. IbLd., at 580-581 (D.LR.).
32. CanadianPacific Airlines v. B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1133.
33. Stubart Investments, Supra n. 13.
34. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, vol.3 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1966), 541-542 (the "Carter Commission").
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This, then, is the backdrop against which the Supreme Court of
Canada was asked to decide whether it would uphold a judicial tax
anti-avoidance rule: the business purpose rule. In Stubart the SCC
unanimously rejected the business purpose test. This was despite the
fact that such a test has worked successfully in the United States for
decades and that the House of Lords in England has in the last decade
similarly recognised the need to combat the increasing use of artificial
tax avoidance schemes with judicial anti-avoidance rules. Justice
Wilson seemed particularly uncomfortable with such a test remarking:
"the business purpose test is a complete rejection of Lord Tomlin's
principle." 3
Lord Tomlin's principle is that a person is entitled to arrange her or
his affairs in any artifical way in order to pay the least amount of
taxation providing it is strictly legal. Again this reveals Justice Wilson's
very atomistic and individualistic view of a citizen's relationship with
and responsibility to the State. It is also a very narrow view of the role
of the government in society which seems unrealistic especially for
corporate citizens who owe their very existence to the state.
Justice Wilson has been similarly disinclined to agree with Revenue Canada on several occasions often outvoted by the rest of the
court. Her decisions in this sphere speak more about her view of the
role of the state in the economic sphere and especially in regulating
corporate activity than they do about strict legal technical reasoning.
So much so that she became, in some ways, the champion of the
corporate taxpayer on the court.
For example, in her dissent in The Queen v. Imperial General
Properties Ltd. 6 Justice Wilson protects a corporation from the
associated corporation rules. She is unwilling to expand the notion of
control, which the rest of the court are prepared to do, in order to
prevent corporate taxpayers from taking unfair and unforeseen advantage of corporate write-offs by double dipping. Her stated reason for
the decision was that the state should intervene specifically via legislation to avoid this situtation if that is the desired effect.
Similarly in CanadianMarconiCo. v. The Queen37 , Justice Wilson
wrote the majority decision. The issue was whether the income in
question could be considered to be from an active business or whether
it was investment income which is treated in these circumstances less
favourably by the income tax system. The income in question was

35. Stubart Investments, Supra n. 13 at 540.
36. The Queen v. Imperial GeneralPropertiesLtd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 288.
37. CanadianMarconi v. The Queen, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 522.
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obtained from investment monies arising from the profits of the sale of
an active business. The appellant was investing the money with the
intention of using it later to purchase another active business.
Justice Wilson allowed the appeal based on the criteria of what
constituted trading activity. Moreover she placed real emphasis on the
fact that there is a rebuttable presumption that corporations are prima
facie engaged in active business especially if their objects of incorporation specifically permit the activity in question. Accordingly, in the
case of a corporate taxpayer there is a presumption in favour of its
income being characterised as income from a business. This is a
presumption which can only benefit corporations rather than people
who carry on a business. Moreover, it is a presumption that was quite
unnecessary for deciding the case. As Vein Krishna points out:
The presumption, albeit rebuttable, that all corporate income is business income offends the statutory scheme in respect of the taxation of
corporate income. ...The hallmark of the scheme is its insistence that
business income is taxed on principles that are quite distinct from those
that apply to investment income. The presumption ignores the statutory framework and was quite unnecessary in the circumstances of the
decision28
This decision may make it increasingly difficult for Revenue Canada
to administer the Act in other areas as well. For example, it has added
considerable uncertainty to establishing when the attribution rules and
foreign accrual property rules apply. This new presumption will make
artificial avoidance schemes very much in vogue once again. Indeed
as Krishna points out "the Supreme Court may inadvertently have
become the white knight for high income taxpayers seeking innova39
tive methods of avoiding income tax.
The Marconidecision was particularly ironic in light of a decision
that was brought down in the same year by the Supreme Court,
Bronfmnan Trusts, where former Chief Justice Dickson said that a
more flexible, purposive approach in interpreting tax legislation was
he believed:
a laudable trend provided it is consistent with the text and purposes of
the taxation statute. Assessment of taxpayers' transactions with an eye
to commercial and economic realities, rather than juristic classification

38. Vein Krishna, "Developments in the Law of Income Taxation: The 1986-87 Term" (1988),
10 Supremne Court Law Review 297 at 300.
39. Krishna, ibid., at 301.
40. R. v. Bronfman Trust, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 32.
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of form, may help to avoid the inequity of tax liability being dependent
upon the taxpayer's sophistication at manipulating a sequence of events
to achieve a patina of compliance with the apparent prerequisites for a
tax deduction. 1
In the Marconidecision Justice Wilson demonstrated an uncharacteristic unwillingness to look at the purpose of the section under
consideration which was to reduce the tax payable only on manufacturing and processing profits. Clearly the investment activity in the
Marconicase fell nowhere within that ambit. Although Justice Wilson
recognised this, she considered it irrelevant - if it falls within the
section then it doesn't matter what the intention of parliament is in the
section because in Justice Wilson's view: "[i]f Parliament intended
42
such a restriction, it must express itself clearly to that effect."
This reasoning which reverts to strict statutory interpretation shows
a marked move away from previous decisions, for example even in
Stubart, the court was firmly of the opinion that the Income Tax Act
should be construed liberally consonant with the "object and spirit" of
that provision.
Moreover the decision shows a surprising, for Justice Wilson, lack
of recognition of the need for judicial creativity as the logical, moral
and efficient response to an increasingly complex economic order. To
lay the responsibility at the door of the legislature is to refuse to look
at the reality. It is now nearly impossible for the legislature to draft
watertight rules which will encompass every, or indeed the majority,
of tax avoidance schemes or activities. The only hope to reduce tax
avoidance, as Vivien Morgan has pointed out, is to create an environment in which the courts give liberal interpretations of tax laws which
give effect to their purpose and broad policy objectives.4 3 Obviously
this is not a view shared by Justice Wilson.
The problem with Justice Wilson's hands-off approach, not applied in many other areas, is of course in a highly complex world it is
impossible for tax legislators to catch the sophisticated tax avoidance
schemes that exist without this exact type of intervention by the
courts.
However Justice Wilson has not always followed the strict interpretation doctrine in all spheres of corporate law. When dealing with
the relationship between employer corporation and employee she has

41. R. v. Bronfman Trust, Supra n. 40 at 52 (S.C.R.).
42. CanadianMarconi v. The Queen, Supra n. 37 at 535.
43. CanadianMarconi Company and Ensie Lid: Case Comment (1986), 34 CTJ 1434.
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employed a much more feminist and interconnected view of the corporate world. In many of these decisions Justice Wilson has shown
that she can take legal knowledge out of its box and with the benefit of
economic and social analysis recognise the fundamental issues in a
case in a way that most of us miss. For although Justice Wilson has
often been the champion of the corporation vis a vis the government,
she has shown a remarkable and thought-provoking understanding of
the dynamics inside the corporate bureaucracy.
The Internal Relations within the Corporation
The internal corporate culture is as important as its more public
presence and in some ways its effects are more invidious and farreaching. As Kathleen Lahey points out:
[The] impacts of corporate cultures are not in fact marginal to the
experiences of women. One central organising principle in complex
capitalist interaction is the isolation and separation of people from
property and from the impact that their actions have on other people.
Another theme is abstraction - human interactions that are focused on
single, limited transactions, instead of taking place in full context, over
time. Women can therefore begin to speculate on the development of a
feminist critical mode that is organized around the values of
contextuality, continuity, and holistic participation. 44
I believe that Justice Wilson has contributed to this project in
attempting to create a more relational and contextual, caring environment within the corporate sphere. For example, Justice Wilson's
views on the role of unions within the economic and corporate sphere
offer some insights into a more collective view of internal corporate
relations and a recognition of the power imbalance which exists between employer and employee. In Public Service Employee Relations
Act' Justice Wilson concurred with the dissenting judgement of
former Chief Justice Dickson. Importantly, in arriving at that judgement great emphasis was placed on the fact the "purpose of section
2(d) [the guarantee of freedom of association] is to recognize the
profoundly social nature of human endeavours and to protect the
individual from State enforced isolation in the pursuit of his or her
own ends.4
In addition Justice Dickson stated:

44. Lahey and Salter, supra, note 28 at 570.
45. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; 38 D.L.R. (4th) 161.
46. Ibid., at 186-197. (Dickson dissent).
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Freedom of association is most essential in those circumstances where
the individual is liable to be prejudiced by the actions of some larger
and more powerful entity, like the government or an employer....it has
enabled those who would otherwise be vulnerable and ineffective to
meet on more equal terms the power and strength of those with whom
their interests interact and, perhaps, conflict. 47
This is a recognition of the interconnectedness with which feminist
literature abounds.
Justice Wilson's almost libertarian distaste for state intervention
vis a vis the external economic activity of corporations - either through
contracts or tax usage - evaporates when she is dealing with the
internal environment of corporations. Justice Wilson resorts to Amy's
ethic of caring when exploring and regulating the internal social and
economic interactions between the corporation qua employer with its
employees. This is amply illustrated in two of Justice Wilson's finest
decisions: Brossard(Ville) v. Quebec (Commission des droits de la
personne)49 and Alberta Human Rights Commission v. Central Alberta Dairy'. In Brossard,Line Laurin was appealing the fact that
due to a municipal anti-nepotism policy, she had not been hired
because her mother was a full-time secretary for the police. The court
unanimously agreed that this was civil status discrimination prohibited by the Quebec Human Rights Code. Justice Wilson felt compelled to go further - exploring the conditions under which the bona
fide clause, which allowed discrimination for good reasons, could be
invoked. Normally the bonafide clause is used in cases where weight,
height, or decency require that the job be done by a particular sex.
Unwilling to set out rigid rules which will apply in all circumstances,
Justice Wilson recognises that law must be placed in its specific social
and economic context. The rule should, therefore, only be situation
specific. Indeed she very skillfully turns the essentially negative bona
fide requirement into a potentially positive action clause commenting:
...coming closer to home, could a municipality which felt under an
obligation as a public body to hire members of minorities as opposed to
having a totally white Anglo-Saxon or French-Canadian police force
47. Ibid., at 197.
48. Justice Wilson's views on interconnectedness and power imbalance did not extend to a right
to secondary picketing. See Retail, Wholesale and DepartmentStore Union,Local 580 et al.v.
DolphinDelivery Ltd., 11986] 33 D.LR. (4th) 174.
49. Brossard(Ville) v. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne) [1988] 2 S.C.R. 279,53
D.L.R. (4th) 608 (Wilson J. concurring).
50. Alberta Human Rights Commission v. CentralAlberta DairyPool [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489,72
D.L.R. (4th) 417 (unanimous) [hereafter referred to as Alberta Dairy Pool cited to D.LR.].
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make the applicant's race or national origin a "qualification" within the
meaning of section 20? I believe that it could if it bona fide believed
that the adoption of such a policy was required in order to satisfy its
obligation to properly police its particular constituency.5'
In this case Justice Wilson recognises the need to encourage corporate bodies to develop a moral understanding of their social and
economic functioning within the bureaucracy.
Justice Wilson was even more forthright in developing this thesis
encompassing the ethics of responsibility and of caring within corporations in the case of Alberta Dairy Pool.52 Justice Wilson skilfully
reverses the Adam Smith turn which the court, including herself, had
taken in Bhinder53 (where a male Sikh who refused to wear a hard hat
had lost his human rights action). In Alberta Dairy Pool, Justice
Wilson specifically rectifies some of the obvious dangers that the
Bhinderdecision gave rise to which were graphically depicted by the
Canadian Human Rights Commission. These were:
...that workplaces may not have to be modified to enable disabled
individuals to earn a livlihood; women who become pregnant and who
require temporary modification of their duties may be forced from their
job: person's who for religious reasons cannot work regular business
hours may have difficulty finding employment...,.
Mindful of these harmful effects which Bhinderhad given rise to,
Justice Wilson circumvents them by placing a specific positive duty
on employers to accommodate these disadvantaged groups except to
the extent that such accommodation would result in "undue hardship"
to the employer. Hence employers will need to take on the ethic of
responsiblity wherever possible. Perhaps for Justice Wilson there is
an increasing sense that there may indeed be a conception of the good.
Feminists are increasingly recognising that social and productive organisations should be structured differently. In this judgement, I
believe Justice Wilson makes an important contribution towards formulating a vision of what this structure might look like and how such
change might be brought about. The importance of doing this cannot
be over-estimated. Corporations are the dominant form of economic
organisation in our society which has crucial and omnipresent consequences for the nature of social relationships. Accordingly, it is

51.
52.
53.
54.

BrossardSupra n. 49 at 654 (D.L.R.).
Supra, note 46.
Bhinder v. CNR Co. (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 481, [1985J 2 S.C.R. 561.
Alberta Dairy Pool (1990), 72 D.L.R. (4th) 417 at 432.
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essential to address, as Justice Wilson has done in these two decisions,
how less empowered groups of employees experience life under it and
how reorganisations can be built that honour ethical and feminist
values - care, responsibility, connection and sharing.
Conclusion
As you know, Justice Wilson contributed to many economic decisions
- I have chosen only a sampler to give you some extent of the breadth
and sometimes contradictory philosophies which guided them. I have
concentrated on those cases which are most troubling to me as well as
those which bring me greatestjoy. Even though I have disagreed with
Justice Wilson legally and ideologically on many occasions, I cannot
end this paper without mentioning the important role she has played
for so many people like me in Canada. Women lawyers, academics,
judges all owe a great debt of gratitude to you. While it might be a
great honour, it is never easy to be the first. As one of the first women
law deans I can personally attest to that. We all make a great many
mistakes - the fact that Justice Wilson made so few is no doubt due to
her wisdom and humanity.
Like so many others, I was very disappointed to hear that you had
chosen to retire. I remember thinking then, as I do now, of an old
quote of Yogi Berra's:
"The future ain't what it used to be."
Justice Wilson, thank you on behalf of men and especially women
everywhere. May you continue to play an important role in our
country.

